fix: Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 77: Uncontrolled data used in path expression

[filipchristiansen]

Potential fix for https://github.com/coderamp-labs/gitingest/security/code-scanning/77

To address this issue, the _parse_local_dir_path function needs to validate the path_str input to ensure it stays within a predefined safe root directory.

1. Validation Strategy:

   • Define a safe root directory (e.g., TMP_BASE_PATH).
   • Normalize the path using Path.resolve() and ensure the resulting path is a subpath of the safe root directory.

2. Implementation:

   • Use os.path.commonpath to compare the normalized path to the safe root directory.
   • Raise an exception if the path escapes the root directory.

3. Changes Required:

   • Modify _parse_local_dir_path in src/gitingest/query_parser.py to include validation logic.

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Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.

[Copilot]

Pull Request Overview

This PR addresses a security vulnerability (code scanning alert no. 77) by implementing path traversal protection in the _parse_local_dir_path function. The change prevents uncontrolled data from being used in path expressions by validating that user-provided paths remain within a safe root directory.

Key Changes:

• Added path validation logic to prevent directory traversal attacks
• Implemented safe root directory boundary checking using os.path.commonpath
• Added exception handling for paths that escape the allowed root directory

[Copilot]

The path validation logic has a potential issue: os.path.commonpath() can raise ValueError if the paths are on different drives (Windows) or if the list is empty. Consider wrapping this in a try-except block and also verify that both paths exist before comparison.

Suggested change

	if os.path.commonpath([root_path, path_obj]) != str(root_path):
	raise InvalidPatternError(f"Path {path_str} escapes the allowed root directory.")
	# Ensure both paths exist
	if not root_path.exists() or not path_obj.exists():
	raise InvalidPatternError(f"One or both paths do not exist: {root_path}, {path_obj}")
	# Check if path_obj is within root_path
	try:
	if os.path.commonpath([root_path, path_obj]) != str(root_path):
	raise InvalidPatternError(f"Path {path_str} escapes the allowed root directory.")
	except ValueError as e:
	raise InvalidPatternError(f"Invalid path comparison: {e}")

[Copilot]

The comparison converts root_path to string but uses the Path object directly in the commonpath call. This could lead to inconsistent behavior. Consider using str(root_path) consistently or compare Path objects directly.

Suggested change

	if os.path.commonpath([root_path, path_obj]) != str(root_path):
	if os.path.commonpath([str(root_path), str(path_obj)]) != str(root_path):

[github-actions]

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