Merge 6.17-rc6 into kbuild-next

Commit bd7c231 ("pinctrl: meson: Fix typo in device table macro")
is needed in kbuild-next to avoid a build error with a future change.

While at it, address the conflict between commit 41f9049 ("riscv:
Only allow LTO with CMODEL_MEDANY") and commit 6578a1f ("riscv:
Remove version check for LTO_CLANG selects"), as reported by Stephen
Rothwell [1].

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250908134913.68778b7b@canb.auug.org.au/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

Author: nathanchance

.mailmap

@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ Domen Puncer <domen@coderock.org>
 Douglas Gilbert <dougg@torque.net>
 Drew Fustini <fustini@kernel.org> <drew@pdp7.com>
 <duje@dujemihanovic.xyz> <duje.mihanovic@skole.hr>
+Easwar Hariharan <easwar.hariharan@linux.microsoft.com> <easwar.hariharan@intel.com>
+Easwar Hariharan <easwar.hariharan@linux.microsoft.com> <eahariha@linux.microsoft.com>
 Ed L. Cashin <ecashin@coraid.com>
 Elliot Berman <quic_eberman@quicinc.com> <eberman@codeaurora.org>
 Enric Balletbo i Serra <eballetbo@kernel.org> <enric.balletbo@collabora.com>
@@ -587,6 +589,7 @@ Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@redhat.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@nvidia.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@isovalent.com>
+Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.x90@mail.toshiba> <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp>
 Odelu Kukatla <quic_okukatla@quicinc.com> <okukatla@codeaurora.org>
 Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> <oleksandr@redhat.com>
 Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de> <bug-track@fisher-privat.net>

CREDITS

@@ -3222,6 +3222,10 @@ D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394
 D: Starter of Linux1394 effort
 S: ask per mail for current address
 
+N: Boris Pismenny
+E: borisp@mellanox.com
+D: Kernel TLS implementation and offload support.
+
 N: Nicolas Pitre
 E: nico@fluxnic.net
 D: StrongARM SA1100 support integrator & hacker
@@ -4168,6 +4172,9 @@ S: 1513 Brewster Dr.
 S: Carrollton, TX 75010
 S: USA
 
+N: Dave Watson
+D: Kernel TLS implementation.
+
 N: Tim Waugh
 E: tim@cyberelk.net
 D: Co-architect of the parallel-port sharing system

Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-block

@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ Contact:	linux-block@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
 		[RW] If the device is registered for writeback throttling, then
 		this file shows the target minimum read latency. If this latency
-		is exceeded in a given window of time (see wb_window_usec), then
+		is exceeded in a given window of time (see curr_win_nsec), then
 		the writeback throttling will start scaling back writes. Writing
 		a value of '0' to this file disables the feature. Writing a
 		value of '-1' to this file resets the value to the default

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/blockdev/zoned_loop.rst

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ zone_capacity_mb   Device zone capacity (must always be equal to or lower than
                    the zone size. Default: zone size.
 conv_zones         Total number of conventioanl zones starting from sector 0.
                    Default: 8.
-base_dir           Path to the base directoy where to create the directory
+base_dir           Path to the base directory where to create the directory
                    containing the zone files of the device.
                    Default=/var/local/zloop.
                    The device directory containing the zone files is always

Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst

@@ -435,8 +435,8 @@ both cgroups.
 Controlling Controllers
 -----------------------
 
-Availablity
-~~~~~~~~~~~
+Availability
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 A controller is available in a cgroup when it is supported by the kernel (i.e.,
 compiled in, not disabled and not attached to a v1 hierarchy) and listed in the

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst

@@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ Spectre_v1            X
 Spectre_v2            X                           X
 Spectre_v2_user                      X                           X            *       (Note 1)
 SRBDS                 X              X            X              X
-SRSO                  X                           X
-SSB                                                                                   (Note 4)
+SRSO                  X              X            X              X
+SSB                                  X
 TAA                   X              X            X              X            *       (Note 2)
 TSA                   X              X            X              X
 =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ========
@@ -229,9 +229,6 @@ Notes:
    3 --  Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled, the CPU is
    vulnerable, and STIBP is not supported
 
-   4 --  Speculative store bypass is always enabled by default (no kernel
-   mitigation applied) unless overridden with spec_store_bypass_disable option
-
 When an attack-vector is disabled, all mitigations for the vulnerabilities
 listed in the above table are disabled, unless mitigation is required for a
 different enabled attack-vector or a mitigation is explicitly selected via a

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -26,3 +26,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    rsb
    old_microcode
    indirect-target-selection
+   vmscape

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+VMSCAPE
+=======
+
+VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that may allow a guest to influence the branch
+prediction in host userspace. It particularly affects hypervisors like QEMU.
+
+Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk encryption keys,
+guest-userspace may be able to attack the guest-kernel using the hypervisor as
+a confused deputy.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+The following CPU families are affected by VMSCAPE:
+
+**Intel processors:**
+  - Skylake generation (Parts without Enhanced-IBRS)
+  - Cascade Lake generation - (Parts affected by ITS guest/host separation)
+  - Alder Lake and newer (Parts affected by BHI)
+
+Note that, BHI affected parts that use BHB clearing software mitigation e.g.
+Icelake are not vulnerable to VMSCAPE.
+
+**AMD processors:**
+  - Zen series (families 0x17, 0x19, 0x1a)
+
+** Hygon processors:**
+ - Family 0x18
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+
+Conditional IBPB
+----------------
+
+Kernel tracks when a CPU has run a potentially malicious guest and issues an
+IBPB before the first exit to userspace after VM-exit. If userspace did not run
+between VM-exit and the next VM-entry, no IBPB is issued.
+
+Note that the existing userspace mitigation against Spectre-v2 is effective in
+protecting the userspace. They are insufficient to protect the userspace VMMs
+from a malicious guest. This is because Spectre-v2 mitigations are applied at
+context switch time, while the userspace VMM can run after a VM-exit without a
+context switch.
+
+Vulnerability enumeration and mitigation is not applied inside a guest. This is
+because nested hypervisors should already be deploying IBPB to isolate
+themselves from nested guests.
+
+SMT considerations
+------------------
+
+When Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) is enabled, hypervisors can be
+vulnerable to cross-thread attacks. For complete protection against VMSCAPE
+attacks in SMT environments, STIBP should be enabled.
+
+The kernel will issue a warning if SMT is enabled without adequate STIBP
+protection. Warning is not issued when:
+
+- SMT is disabled
+- STIBP is enabled system-wide
+- Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection)
+
+System information and options
+------------------------------
+
+The sysfs file showing VMSCAPE mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ * 'Not affected':
+
+   The processor is not vulnerable to VMSCAPE attacks.
+
+ * 'Vulnerable':
+
+   The processor is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace':
+
+   Conditional IBPB mitigation is enabled. The kernel tracks when a CPU has
+   run a potentially malicious guest and issues an IBPB before the first
+   exit to userspace after VM-exit.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT':
+
+   IBPB is issued on every VM-exit. This occurs when other mitigations like
+   RETBLEED or SRSO are already issuing IBPB on VM-exit.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+----------------------------------------------
+
+The mitigation can be controlled via the ``vmscape=`` command line parameter:
+
+ * ``vmscape=off``:
+
+   Disable the VMSCAPE mitigation.
+
+ * ``vmscape=ibpb``:
+
+   Enable conditional IBPB mitigation (default when CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y).
+
+ * ``vmscape=force``:
+
+   Force vulnerability detection and mitigation even on processors that are
+   not known to be affected.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3829,6 +3829,7 @@
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       vmscape=off [X86]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -8041,6 +8042,16 @@
 	vmpoff=		[KNL,S390] Perform z/VM CP command after power off.
 			Format: <command>
 
+	vmscape=	[X86] Controls mitigation for VMscape attacks.
+			VMscape attacks can leak information from a userspace
+			hypervisor to a guest via speculative side-channels.
+
+			off		- disable the mitigation
+			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
+					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
+			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
+					  unaffected processors
+
 	vsyscall=	[X86-64,EARLY]
 			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
 			fixed addresses of 0xffffffffff600x00 from legacy