fronend/sr/hook/useModelTasks.ts

[krewdev]

This analysis focuses exclusively on identifying potential security vulnerabilities within the provided TypeScript/React custom hook code, assuming standard web application deployment context.

1. Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Unsanitized Error Messages

a. Vulnerability Type

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Stored/Reflected (depending on the source of the error message).

b. Explanation

The refresh function handles API errors and uses the resulting error message to update the component state (loadingError). This state is constructed using extractErrorMessage(e), which likely pulls error details directly from the server response or the exception object.

If the server returns an error message containing malicious HTML or script tags (e.g., due to a server-side vulnerability or malicious input reflected in the error), and the consuming React component later renders this loadingError state directly into the DOM without proper sanitization (e.g., using dangerouslySetInnerHTML or simply rendering an unsanitized string), an XSS attack can occur. The client-side code trusts the content returned by the error extraction utility.

c. Problematic Line(s) of Code

setLoadingError("An error occurred while loading tasks list." + extractErrorMessage(e));

2. Information Leakage via Conditional Debug Logging

a. Vulnerability Type

Information Leakage / Exposure of Sensitive Data.

b. Explanation

The code uses a global application setting (window.APP_SETTINGS.debug) to conditionally log detailed internal information, including raw exception objects (e) and detailed validation results (vr), to the browser console.

If this debug flag is inadvertently left enabled in a production environment, it exposes internal application logic, detailed server error stack traces, API response structures, and validation failure details to any end-user. This information can significantly aid an attacker in reconnaissance, helping them map out the application's structure and identify potential weaknesses for further exploitation.

c. Problematic Line(s) of Code

window.APP_SETTINGS.debug && console.error(vr);
// ...
window.APP_SETTINGS.debug && console.error(e);

3. Lack of Input Validation on API Parameters

a. Vulnerability Type

Input Validation Deficiency / Denial of Service (DoS) Potential.

b. Explanation

Several functions (update, remove, assignTasks, unassignTasks) accept numerical IDs or arrays of IDs (modelTaskIds: number[]) which are then used directly in API calls without any client-side validation beyond TypeScript typing.

Specifically, in assignTasks and unassignTasks, the modelTaskIds array is passed directly into the request body. If a malicious or compromised calling component passes an extremely large array (e.g., thousands or millions of IDs), the client application will attempt to serialize and send this massive payload. This can lead to unnecessary resource consumption on both the client and the server, potentially contributing to a client-side or server-side Denial of Service condition if the server-side API is not strictly limiting the size of the input array.

c. Problematic Line(s) of Code

const assignTasks = useCallback((modelID: number, modelTaskIds: number[]) => {
return api.call("assignModelTasks", {
params: {
model_id: modelID.toString(),
},
body: {
task_ids: modelTaskIds, // No validation on array size or content
},
});
}, [api]);

--- RUNNING RED TEAM (EXPLOITER) ---

Red Team Analysis Report: useModelTasks Hook

Target: Client-Side React Hook (useModelTasks.ts)
Objective: Identify potential attack vectors and security weaknesses in the client-side implementation of API interaction logic.

Executive Summary

The analyzed React hook manages CRUD and assignment operations for "Model Tasks" by interacting with a backend API via the useApi() provider.

The primary security concern is the direct use of client-supplied numeric IDs (for tasks and models) in API parameters without any visible client-side authorization or ownership checks. This design pattern creates a high-risk environment for Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attacks, assuming the backend does not robustly enforce object ownership.

Furthermore, the hook passes user-supplied data (body) directly to the API endpoints for creation and updates, relying entirely on the backend for input validation and sanitization, which is a common precursor to various injection attacks.

---

Vulnerability 1: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

The functions responsible for modifying or deleting specific resources (update, remove, assignTasks, unassignTasks) accept resource IDs directly from the client and use them as request parameters.

Attack Vector

IDOR via id and model_id parameters in update, remove, assignTasks, and unassignTasks functions.

Attack Plan

1. Target Identification: I would intercept the network traffic generated by a legitimate user performing an action, such as updating their own task (e.g., PUT /api/modelTasks/123).
2. Parameter Manipulation: I would then modify the intercepted request, changing the numeric ID parameter (id or model_id) to target a resource belonging to another user (e.g., changing 123 to 456).
3. Execution: I would attempt to execute the modified request (e.g., DELETE /api/modelTasks/456) to delete or modify a task or model assignment that I do not own or manage.

Example Strategy: When calling remove(id: number), the attacker would supply an ID belonging to a victim's task.

// Attacker calls this function with a victim's ID
remove(456); // 456 is the victim's task ID
// Request generated: DELETE /api/deleteModelTasks?id=456

Potential Impact

If the backend API endpoints (deleteModelTasks, updateModelTasks, assignModelTasks, unassignModelTasks) fail to perform proper authorization checks (i.e., verifying that the authenticated user is the owner or has permission to modify the specified id or model_id), an attacker could achieve:

1. Data Tampering/Destruction: Unauthorized modification or deletion of arbitrary tasks or model assignments across the entire application.
2. Business Logic Bypass: Assigning tasks to models they do not manage, or unassigning tasks from models managed by others.

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Vulnerability 2: Injection Vector via Request Body

The create and update functions accept a body object containing user-supplied data (e.g., task name, description, configuration details) and pass it directly to the API call without any client-side sanitization or validation of the content.

Attack Vector

Injection attacks (e.g., SQL Injection, NoSQL Injection, or Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is later rendered unsafely) via the body parameter in create and update.

Attack Plan

1. Payload Construction: I would craft a malicious payload designed to exploit the underlying database or backend processing logic.
2. Injection Attempt (Database): If the backend uses the input fields directly in a database query without proper parameterization, I would inject database-specific control characters.
   • Strategy: For a SQL backend, I would attempt to inject a string containing characters like ' or -- to break out of the intended query structure.
3. Injection Attempt (XSS/RCE): If the task data is later rendered in a browser view without encoding, or if the backend processes the data using unsafe deserialization methods, I would inject script tags or serialized objects.
   • Strategy: Injecting a string like <script>alert(1)</script> into a field like task_name.

Potential Impact

The impact is entirely dependent on the backend's security posture:

1. Data Breach/Manipulation (High): Successful SQL/NoSQL injection could lead to unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of sensitive data, including user credentials or application configuration.
2. Cross-Site Scripting (Medium): If the created/updated task data is displayed to other users without output encoding, stored XSS could compromise user sessions or lead to client-side defacement.
3. Denial of Service (Medium): Injection of overly complex or malformed data could cause the backend database or application server to crash or slow down significantly.

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Vulnerability 3: Information Leakage via Debugging

The refresh function includes conditional error logging based on a global setting.

// In refresh function:
window.APP_SETTINGS.debug && console.error(vr);
// ...
window.APP_SETTINGS.debug && console.error(e);

Attack Vector

Information leakage through verbose error messages when debug mode is enabled in a production environment.

Attack Plan

1. Check Configuration: I would check the client-side configuration (window.APP_SETTINGS.debug) to see if it is set to true in the production environment.
2. Trigger Errors: I would intentionally send malformed requests (e.g., invalid JSON, missing required fields) to the API endpoints to trigger server-side errors that might be caught and logged by the client-side catch block.
3. Harvest Data: I would monitor the browser console for detailed error objects (e or vr) which might contain sensitive information such as stack traces, internal server paths, or database query fragments.

Potential Impact

Exposure of internal system details (e.g., server architecture, file paths, library versions, or specific validation failures) that can aid an attacker in mapping the application and planning more sophisticated attacks.

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Next Steps for Investigation (Backend Focus)

Since this analysis was limited to the client-side code, the true severity of the identified IDOR and Injection vectors depends entirely on the backend implementation. My immediate next steps would be to pivot the investigation to the server-side API endpoints:

1. Backend Authorization Review:

   • Goal: Verify that every endpoint accepting an ID parameter (/modelTasks/{id}, /assignModelTasks, etc.) strictly enforces ownership checks (e.g., WHERE owner_id = current_user_id) before executing the requested operation.
   • Priority: High, especially for DELETE and PUT operations.

2. Input Validation and Sanitization Review:

   • Goal: Confirm that all data received in the request body (for create and update) is validated against expected data types, length constraints, and is properly parameterized or escaped before being used in database queries.
   • Priority: High, to mitigate SQL/NoSQL injection risks.

3. API Endpoint Mapping:

   • Goal: Determine the HTTP methods and exact paths corresponding to the abstract API calls (e.g., what is the full path and method for api.call("addModelTasks")?). This is crucial for understanding rate limiting, CSRF protection, and overall API structure.